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REFORMING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A
RADICALLY MODERATE-AND
ETHICAL-FASHION
Paul C. Weiler*
INTRODUCTION
The major focus of tort reform battles in both state and federal leg-
islatures has long been medical malpractice. Thus, after the 2002 elec-
tion put his Republican Party in charge of both branches of Congress,
President George W. Bush presented their favorite brand of malprac-
tice reform, a legal cap on pain and suffering damages to injured pa-
tients.1 His stated rationale was that "what we all want is quality
* Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This Article will also be the first
chapter in my ongoing book project, Radically Moderate Law Reform, with later chapters de-
voted to such other contemporary public policy issues as "Enhancing Worker Lives Through Fair
Labor and Worklife Law," "Renovating Our Recreational Crimes" (about using marijuana and
betting on sports), and "Constitutionalizing and/or Democratizing Our Lives" (about abortion,
affirmative action, and gay marriage). This key part of that work is largely based on: (1) the
major empirical research project that I engaged in with my partners in the Harvard Medical
Practice Studies (HMPS) in New York, Colorado, and Utah, investigating the risks of both medi-
cal and legal mistakes being made here; and (2) the tort reform project that I did with my part-
ners for the American Law Institute (ALI), devising the most efficient and also ethical reforms
of all tort law, including medical malpractice. For two books that synopsized those reports in
connection with the subject of this Article, see PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON
TRIAL (2001); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE (1991).
This Article also relies on a host of other scholarly analyses written over the last decade,
especially by Dr. Troy Brennan, who was not only my partner in both projects, but was rendered
especially expert in this field by having gone to both medical and law school. For an update of
the key data about medical injuries and lawsuits, see VASANTHAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS (2001). For a depiction of the key principles that
should now govern all legislative tort reform, see CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAK-
ING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE AND WHO SHOULD Do IT (2003). For the viewpoint
of a prominent lawyer advocating serious tort reform for the "common good," rather than just
the interests of lawyers or doctors, see PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON
GOOD: How AMERICA'S LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM (2001). I want to
thank Dr. Brennan, Dr. Howard Hiatt, my co-chair of the HMPS, and Professors Kip Viscusi
and Ken Abraham, my other partners in the ALI tort reform scholarly effort, for their really
helpful comments and suggestions for this Article.
1. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R.
5, 108th Cong. (2003).
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health care, not rich trial lawyers,"2 whom he labeled "the only win-
ners" in the "giant [lawsuit] lottery."'3
This specific measure was actually signed into law back in 1975 by
Ronald Reagan in one of his earlier roles as Governor of California. 4
That pioneering law, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA), placed a $250,000 ceiling on pain and suffering damages-
the same number President Bush proposed in 2003.- As notable mal-
practice defense attorney, James Griffith, stated in celebrating that
legislative measure, American juries too often "act like Santa Claus,
handing out millions of dollars in cases involving comparably minor
injuries."'6 Thus, several other states followed California's lead
throughout the 1980s. However, the fact that Hillary Clinton, in her
1993 Report and recommendation to her Presidential husband,7 was
not prepared to follow Reagan's lead (and instead had another impor-
tant change in malpractice law) played an important role in blocking
any reforms in our broader health care system on behalf of present
and future American patients.
This malpractice issue returned to the political arena at the begin-
ning of this new millennium because our doctors-especially obstetri-
cians and surgeons-received the rather distressing news that their
malpractice premium costs were suddenly surging upwards.8 In re-
sponse, not only did numerous doctors announce that they were going
to stop practicing (at least in these costly specialties), but also begin-
ning in West Virginia on January 1, 2003, and then expanding to Jack-
sonville, Florida, Newark, New Jersey, Long Island, New York, and
elsewhere, they mounted major work stoppages in protest. 9 One
American Medical Association (AMA) member even proposed at its
2. Tanya Albert, Bush Decries "Junk Lawsuits," Calls for Federal Tort Reform, AM. MED.
NEWS, Aug. 12, 2002, at 2.
3. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Access to Health Care (Jan. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/20040128-2.html.
4. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) (codified at CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003), CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1997), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 340.5, 1295 (West 1982)).
5. H.R. 5 § 4.
6. James D. Griffith, What Will It Take to Resolve the Malpractice Crisis?, MED. ECON., Sept.
27, 1982, at 195.
7. DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE WHITE HOUSE, HEALTH SECURITY: THE PRESIDENT'S
REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 78-79 (1993).
8. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FAC-
TORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, Highlights Page (June 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf (providing very useful data about the
movement in malpractice insurer premiums over the last decade).
9. See, e.g., Tanya Albert, N.J. Physicians Stop Work in Biggest Liability Protest Yet, AM. MED.
NEWS, Feb. 17, 2003, at 1.
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2004 conference that doctors should not be providing medical services
to malpractice plaintiffs' lawyers and their spouses. 10 As then-Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott put it, the source of this sudden drop in
doctor earnings was trial lawyers, "a pack of wolves [who are] going to
kill the goose that laid the golden egg."11 Thus, his successor as Ma-
jority Leader, Dr. Bill Frist (the first practicing physician to reach the
Senate since 1938), set out to rein in these lawyers and their lawsuits.' 2
Almost all the Democratic Senators opposed this specific measure
because, as California Senator Dianne Feinstein pointed out, her sur-
geon husband (and AMA member) was protected in their home state
by a $250,000 damages cap, which, if simply adjusted for overall price
inflation (rather than health care or stock market inflation), would
now be worth $780,000. Neither side was prepared to accept the Fein-
stein compromise proposal of a basic $500,000 pain and suffering cap
without an important exception for the victims of truly "catastrophic"
medical negligence.1 3
Thus, in stark contrast to President Bush's (unfortunately) success-
ful effort to again reduce the taxes paid by those whom the AMA was
labeling as "greedy lawyers, ' 14 and the American Trial Lawyers Asso-
ciation (ATLA) was labeling "negligent doctors killing their pa-
tients,"' 5 (as well as all other well-to-do Americans), this measure-
which, ironically, was titled Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost,
Timely Healthcare,1 6 to earn the nickname, HEALTH-was foiled in
the 2003 Senate. 17 This proved to be an important issue in the Presi-
dential 2004 election campaign-in which George W. Bush was chal-
lenged not only by lawyer John Kerry, but also by his tort-lawyer Vice
Presidential running mate, John Edwards.18 American voters deserve
to learn the truth about what this medical and legal problem actually
consists of, and then what is the truly fair and constructive way to
10. Tanya Albert, AMA to Study Liability Surcharges, AM. MED. NEWS, July 5, 2004, at 1.
11. Jim VandeHei, GOP Plans New Caps on Court Awards, WASH. PosT, Dec. 29, 2002, at
A5.
12. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, S.
607, 108th Cong. (2003).
13. Tanya Albert, Tort Reform Clears House, Moves Forward in States, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr.
7, 2003, at 1.
14. Tanya Albert, Tax Break on Liability Insurance Proposed, AM. MED. NEWS, June 2, 2003,
at 7.
15. Berkeley Rice, Do Doctors Kill 80,000 Patients A Year?, MED. ECON., Nov. 21, 1994, at 53.
16. S. 607.
17. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 9.
18. Joel B. Finkelstein, Edwards' Trial Lawyer Past Raises Red Flags for Doctors, AM. MED.
NEWS, Aug. 2, 2004, at 1.
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reform this part of our legal regime and thence, hopefully, also our
overall health care system.1 9
II. THE REAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE "CRISIS"
Medical malpractice insurance premiums charged to doctors have
certainly been rising over the last three years-especially for special-
ties and settings like the orthopedists in Jacksonville, Florida who saw
their premiums surge by more than 50% in that period. However,
there are several intellectual fallacies in the standard political rhetoric,
including the claim that this is a problem created by malpractice litiga-
tion, and even more, the claim that this is the key reason why our
health insurance costs have gone up at least 10% a year since 2000.20
First, we should all be aware of the fact that malpractice insurance
and litigation costs have long represented just around 1% of our total
health care costs-which have soared from $27 billion in 1960, or 5%
of our gross domestic product (GDP), to $1.4 trillion, or 15% of our
GDP.21 And while total malpractice litigation costs of around $15 bil-
lion cannot possibly be significantly responsible for that surge in total
health care expenditures, the latter has generated a sizable portion of
these rising malpractice costs because a large share of the tort com-
pensation for malpractice victims consists of the expensive medical
treatments required by the medical injury.
Of course, from the perspective of doctors and their families, what
they have been experiencing must seem as economically disabling as
the physical disability experienced by a few of their patients-for ex-
ample, the surgeons in Miami, Florida who were suddenly charged
19. Indeed, there is also a striking illustration of how this may be fitting with the much
broader public policy challenges facing America in this new millennium. In late May 2004, after
being part of one of the first fully legalized gay marriages in the United States, Cindy Kalish filed
a medical malpractice suit against the clinic that had been treating her new lesbian spouse,
Michelle Charron, alleging that "loss of consortium" had occurred as a result of the clinic's
negligent failure to detect breast cancer in Charron early enough for effective treatment. Newly
Married Lesbians File Malpractice Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at 23. In Feliciano v.
Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (Mass. 1987), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ruled that unmarried partners cannot bring such loss of consortium lawsuits; consequently,
this major constitutional debate is also going to have an impact on medical malpractice-and
hopefully its truly ethical reform.
20. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PRE-
MIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 6 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.iltla.con/Medical%
20Malpractice/GAO-8_03_implications risingpremiums.pdf.
21. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 4 (1991) (stating that total
health care expenditures in 1960 amounted to around $25 billion, or 5% of GDP). See also
VASANTHAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS 203 (2001)
(stating that the United States spent about $1.149 trillion, or 13.5 % of GDP, on health care in
1998).
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more than $200,000 a year for their personal malpractice insurance. 22
This certainly is a legitimate concern, and one for which I will eventu-
ally provide the most ethical as well as efficient solutions (and by
"ethical," I mean serving the genuine public interest of everyone af-
fected, not just the private interests of those closest to the government
currently in power). Again, though, a little history and economic
analysis is important to help us understand why we should not blame
"greedy" tort lawyers for this physician plight.
Recall that over the last three decades we have experienced three
different episodes of essentially the same malpractice insurance crisis.
The first took place in the early 1970s, and inspired California's Gov-
ernor Ronald Reagan to fashion that state's pioneering $250,000 cap
on pain and suffering damages. 23 Then, in the mid-1980s the same
crisis returned, so that numerous other states adopted that same mea-
sure 24 (though California decided it needed to add some constraints
on insurance premium increases to match what it had done to jury
damages awards). With that historic perspective, we should recognize
that the common factor in each of these crises was not a sudden surge
in malpractice suits and awards, but rather a dramatic drop in the fi-
nancial markets. In each of those financial settings, the insurers felt
compelled to sharply increase their malpractice premiums. In effect,
they made their doctor-clients serve as the human shield for their
stockholders against the unhappy consequences of having gambled in
the stock market. Obviously, this was more disturbing to physicians in
cities like Miami, Florida and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where, be-
cause of historically more generous jury verdicts, the absolute pre-
mium size was already much higher than in fellow-state cities like
Tampa Bay and Pittsburgh.
Much more than any other form of tort insurance (especially for
automobile accidents), medical malpractice insurers find a large part
of their revenues and the biggest source of their profits to be in the
financial marketplace. This is because of the relatively lengthy period
between the time when doctors pay their premiums while treating
their patients and the time when the insurers are compelled by law-
suits to pay any substantial sums of damages to the few patients seri-
ously injured in that insured year. The period of time averages over
22. See Tanya Albert, Liability Premium Increases Slowing, Yet Rates Remain at Record High,
AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 15, 2004, at 1.
23. MICRA (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003), CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3333 (West 1997), CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 340.5, 1295 (West 1982)).
24. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 10 (1991).
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five years, and often amounts to an eight to ten year time lag.2 5 That
is why it has always been rational for malpractice insurers to take that
money and invest it in a fashion that will provide substantial addi-
tional revenue for the litigation costs when they come due.
However, these insurers were induced to make the same investment
mistakes in the mid to late 1990s that the general public made-
sharply increasing the share of their revenues in the stock market to
20%, including in what were then hugely popular, high technology
NASDAQ firms (though the bulk of their investments remained in
bonds). The immediate result was that doctors received all of the ben-
efit of higher interest rates and a surging stock market because of the
serious price competition among their insurers. The average premi-
ums remained remarkably stable even though malpractice payments
continued to rise and even though there was a bigger growth in health
care costs and physician income during that decade. But when the
bond interest rates started to fall and the stock market bubble burst in
2000, a number of major insurers (e.g., the second largest, St. Paul
Companies) went entirely out of this brand of liability insurance. 26
Those left in the market responded to those higher costs and lower
competition by quickly raising their premiums to protect their own
profits and shareholders. 27 For example, while the rate of malpractice
insurance payments to patients in New Jersey actually declined by
21% from 2001 through 2003, the insurance premiums charged to doc-
tors surged there in the same way as was occurring across the United
States.
Thus, physicians who had grown accustomed to their artificially low
premiums in the late 1990s suddenly felt distressed by that new charge
because they could not make the same instant increase in their own
fees, since it was then necessary to do so with public and private
health care insurers, not their patients.28 That is why so many obste-
tricians and surgeons in places like Miami, Florida and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania decided to retire, and their younger colleagues set off on
a quest to secure their insurers' favorite law reforms-damages caps
and the like. 29
25. See generally Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005) (discussing the length of the "tail" in malpractice insurance).
26. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 31.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Tanya Albert, No State Immune to Liability Stress, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 23,
2004, at 1.
29. Tanya Albert, Tort Reform Clears House, Moves Forward in States, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr.
7, 2003, at 1.
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III. RELATIONS BETWEEN MALPRACTICE AND
HEALTH CARE COSTS
As we will see shortly, there are several major legal flaws in our
current malpractice system that merit the kind of radically moderate
reforms my scholarly partners and I have long been advocating. First,
though, I should explain why the kinds of proposals now being made
are unethical as well as irrational.
Ironically, the typically conservative advocates have long said that
state autonomy should be protected from federal interference and
constraints. Here, though, they not only want Washington to govern a
truly local issue-the amount an injured patient can secure in a state
court from her doctor, hospital, and their liability insurers-but also
actually override the far more rational decisions made by several state
legislatures who have adjusted their pain and suffering damages caps
to inflation. Instead of President Bush ordaining former California
Governor Reagan's $250,000 figure (which now should have reached
nearly $800,000 if inflation were adjusted in the same fashion as that
enjoyed by doctors, lawyers, and everyone else under our federal in-
come tax law), he should at least rely on either Maryland's current
$620,000 cap,30 or the $750,000 figure currently sought in his home
state of Texas.31
Next, we should be aware of the fallacy in blaming malpractice liti-
gation for our rising health care costs. First, as we have already seen,
malpractice insurance premiums account for just over 1% of total
health care expenditures. If anything, it is our steadily rising treat-
ment costs that explain a significant part of the price of malpractice
insurance. Even if we solely focus on the relations between malprac-
tice litigation law and its own liability insurance costs (whose current
$15 billion figure is certainly quite sizable), we reach the same result.32
From 1991 through 2002, in the thirty-two states (including the Dis-
trict of Columbia) without damages caps, medical malpractice pay-
ments made to patient-litigants rose by 38% and the premiums
charged to doctors rose by 36%, but in the nineteen states with those
caps, the same financial figures were much higher-71% and 48%
respectively.
The one exception to that latter trend, California, is the only dam-
ages cap state that eventually chose to give its physicians the benefit
of lower malpractice premiums by constraining what their insurers
30. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b)(2) (2002).
31. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 1986).
32. I learned this from a recent Weiss Ratings Group report.
2005]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
could charge, and not just what their juries could award.33 Ironically,
though, the California Supreme Court felt compelled to read into that
1988 Referendum, Proposition 38, a special exception to guarantee
that the insurers were earning, not losing, money from this serious
business risk34-something that court has never done for the impact
that a three-decades old, non-inflation adjusted damages cap may be
having on the insured patients' lives. Thus, if our legislators (and
judges) are going to be truly principled here, they should stop passing
laws that in fact are principally protecting the profits of insurers,
rather than the prices of their doctor-clients. Even more importantly,
they should give priority to the needs of the patients who are ulti-
mately paying them both.
With respect to doctors, for example, while the net incomes of some
have slumped in the last couple of years, over the last several decades
they have surged more than any other profession in any other country.
Not only does the average American doctor earn roughly twice what
the average American lawyer earns (though top lawyers, especially a
few tort lawyers, make far more than our top doctors), but also the
median physician earnings are twice as high as all worker earnings in
France, and four times as high in Canada, while the United States la-
bor market now has doctors earning six times the amount of their
worker-patients.
Indeed, this relative earnings increase has taken place at the same
time the number of American doctors has also surged. Over the last
three decades, the supply of physicians has grown by approximately
125%, 3 5 and relative to the increasing population, by 75%.36 This in-
cludes the supposedly endangered specialties of surgeons and
obstetricians.
Understandably, these latter groups feel especially troubled by what
has happened to their net incomes recently, though again if they have
a broader historical perspective they should be aware that during the
Nixon Administration, their top tax rates were 72% 37 whereas Presi-
dent Bush has dropped them to 35%.38 That is why we should be
troubled by our current popular, not just political, culture giving prior-
ity in medical malpractice "reform" efforts to the cause of healthy
doctors (even more, to their profitable insurers), rather than to their
33. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.01, 1861.05 (West 1993).
34. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1270 (Cal. 1989).
35. See BHAT, supra note 21, at 155-56.
36. Id. at 156.
37. See Tax Policy Center, Historical Top Tax Rate, at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/Tax
Facts/FDB/FFremplate.cfm?Docid=213 (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 1(i)(2) (2000).
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largely working class patients. Indeed, we have been imposing a cap
on damages to the most seriously injured patients, and thus the ones
most in need of fair legal treatment.
It is not just these injured patients who have been the victims of our
relatively unfair versions of malpractice "reform," but also the poten-
tial patients who have suffered from the absence of another kind of
federal reform needed in our overall health care insurance system.
Especially in the early years of the Clinton Administration, one of the
major obstacles to obtaining malpractice reform was the constant bat-
tle between lawyers and doctors about whether and how to change
our malpractice litigation rules.39 It is important, then, that the gen-
eral public be taught what a sensible brand of tort reform is, so we can
start to transform our entire health care regime.
To gain some perspective on the latter issue, our total health care
costs (in current dollars) have risen from around $125 billion in 1960
to over $1 trillion today.40 Thus, not only do we have the world's big-
gest tort (not just medical malpractice) system in the world-now
amounting to about 2.5% of our GDP-but also by far the world's
most expensive health care system. While the British, German, and
Japanese people spend between 7% and 8.5% of their respective
GDP's on their publicly provided health care, Americans spend ap-
proximately 15% of our GDP on largely private health care and its
insurance. 41
Some relative virtues of the private marketplace exist, even for as
crucial a matter of public interest as caring for everyone's health. But
perhaps the single most troubling feature of becoming the world's
most economically unequal major democracy is the disparity in health
insurance coverage, and thus the immediate access to helpful (not just
negligent) care. 42 This is not much of a problem if one is elderly and
covered by Medicare, or even truly poor and covered by Medicaid, or
a well-to-do or unionized worker covered by private insurance. But at
any one time there are now 43 million Americans who do not have
employers or anyone else offering them health insurance as part of
their compensation package for working (or studying), 43 and annually
many more experience that same fate. Not only is there a major racial
disparity in this health care coverage-ranging from 11% of white
39. See David Rogers, Initial Clinton Medical Malpractice Reform Plan Pulled After Resistance
by Entrenched Interests, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A20.
40. BHAT, supra note 21, at 3.
41. Id. at 205.
42. Id. at 203.
43. Id.
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families to 18% of African-Americans and 35% of Hispanic-Ameri-
cans 4 4-but also there is disparity by state, with Minnesota residents
insured at only half the national average of 14% and Texas residents
almost doubling it at 27%.
Thus, if a family member becomes really sick, either he or she does
not get the necessary helpful and expensive treatment-and an esti-
mated 18,000 unnecessary American deaths occur every year because
of lack of access to health care 45-or he or she does get the necessary
treatment by imposing on the family a major financial burden for the
rest of their lives. The only way we can treat this most troubling fea-
ture of American health care is by reaching a political settlement in
favor of taking the truly fair route to reforming the legal treatment of
medical malpractice litigation.
IV. THE TRUE FLAWS IN BOTH ROOMS
To make the fully intelligent judgment on that latter score, however,
we should know what our prospects are in the hospital operating room
as well as in the courtroom. Thus, I shall briefly synopsize the key
findings made by my great physician-scholar partners Dr. Howard Hi-
att and Dr. Troy Brennan as part of the Harvard Medical Practice
Studies (HMPS) made in the 1980s in New York and then in the 1990s
in Colorado and Utah.46
First, around one quarter of the times a patient seeks medical treat-
ment, he or she suffers an "adverse" outcome, such as an injury. Of
the 85% of these medical injuries which we could realistically judge on
this second question, about 35% were due to negligent treatment.
Among all of the adverse events, around 3% produced permanent dis-
abilities, and another 14% generated deaths. Thus, applying these
New York figures (which we essentially corroborated in Colorado and
Utah) to the 35 million annual hospitalizations across the country,
these produce 350,000 medical injuries, of which around 10,000 are
serious and permanent disabilities, and of which 75,000 are fatal.
How does our legal regime function in relation to our health care
system? By comparison with the annual 115,000 negligent medical in-
44. Id. at 235.
45. Dianne M. Wolman & Wilhelmine Miller, Understanding the Magnitude of the Problem:
The Consequences of Uninsurance for Individuals, Families, Communities, and the Nation, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 397, 400 (2004).
46. For a detailed discussion of these findings, see HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY,
PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PA-
TIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990) [hereinafter HMPS]. See also WEILER, supra note
21; PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE (1993).
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juries or deaths, there are about 55,000 lawsuits, of which just 15,000
produce any payments at all (whether through settlements or jury
awards). In other words, there is just one paid malpractice claim for
every twenty-one negligent medical injuries, and just one for every
eight serious or fatal injuries.
Why is there only one malpractice suit filed for every two negli-
gently injured patients? And why do only a minority share of these
suits win any money at all? The first reason is that while scientists are
able to detect these adverse events, the lay patient usually cannot dis-
tinguish the consequences of her treatment from her original illness,
let alone tell whether the professional treatment was actually negli-
gent. Next, while the bulk of the negligent injuries are relatively mi-
nor, it is always costly for the plaintiff's lawyer (working for just a
percentage of the recovery) to mount such a tort suit in this complex
health care setting (in comparison to the setting for litigation involv-
ing auto accidents, for'example). Even if the injury is a serious one, if
it has happened to a poor patient who was unemployed and is covered
by Medicaid, then there are no significant financial losses (as opposed
to emotional pain and suffering) to sue for. Finally, those who are
over sixty-five are about twice as likely to suffer serious and negligent
injuries as those aged between fifteen and sixty-five (because they are
even more likely to be going to the hospital for treatment) and are far
less likely to sue because Medicare is covering these additional health
care costs. Those over sixty-five are mostly retired and thus not losing
any income, and do not have much expected time to live in pain and
suffering with their disability.
Trial lawyers regularly cite those HMPS findings as supporting their
case for legislation expanding rather than contracting malpractice liti-
gation.47 I should note here what I will elaborate later on in justifying
my radically moderate tort reform proposals. My expert HMPS col-
leagues discovered that the majority of malpractice payments
(whether by way of settlement or jury verdict) did not involve any
negligent treatment at all, and a substantial minority share did not
even have a medical injury (as opposed to the original illness getting
worse). Of all the malpractice claims we studied, 42% of those with
no adverse events secured an average $29,000 payment; of those with
medical injuries but no negligence, 46% collected an average of
$98,000; and of those with both an adverse injury and medical negli-
gence, 56% received an average of $201,000 through our legal system.
47. See Rice, supra note 15, at 46.
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In sum, while our tort law obviously does to some extent recognize
the presence or absence of both adverse medical injuries and doctor
or other health care provider negligence, such recognition is far more
likely to be expressed in the amount, rather than the likelihood of
individual tort recovery. We do need some important malpractice law
reforms, but only those that focus on the actual needs of patients,
rather than just on the interests of doctors, hospitals, their insurers,
and the lawyers on both sides of the courtroom.
But in reforming our malpractice law to produce a far more level
legal field, we must also remember that we have or will be playing
three different roles as patients. First, if we are one of those patients
who was injured in the hospital-especially seriously injured when we
were supposed to be working-we need and deserve fair compensa-
tion to be provided quickly, rather than facing a damages cap follow-
ing long struggles and delays in the courtroom (while the insurers are
perhaps gambling again in the financial market). Next, if we are one
of those patients who is about to be treated and wants to avoid ad-
verse effects from that care, we need our legal system to provide
strong incentives for our doctors and other health care staff to be truly
careful, not just economical and/or profitable. Finally, if we are one of
the vast array of future patients who now are actually bearing the
costs of our sizeable $15 billion malpractice insurance budget (though
a relatively tiny portion of the health care expenditures we are all
funding), we must have this malpractice money spent in the most effi-
cient and economical manner possible.
V. RATIONAL AS WELL AS ETHICAL DAMAGE REFORM
We begin with damages awards, which are the main focus of legisla-
tive intervention in the malpractice field, especially now that the aver-
age jury award has risen from $360,000 in 1994 to slightly over $1
million today. For example, the New York legislators felt compelled
to immediately reform that state's law after its Court of Appeals, in
Desiderio v. Ochs,48 actually increased the jury award from $40 mil-
lion to $140 million (paid out over fifty-five years) in favor of infant
Samuel Desiderio for the permanent brain disability inflicted by his
delivery.49 As we shall see, besides pain and suffering, which has al-
ways attracted the bulk of the popular as well as political attention,
there have regularly been legislative debates and actions regarding
what to do when some part of the injured patient's financial damages
48. 791 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2003).
49. Id. at 948.
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have already been paid by such "collateral" sources as health care or
salary insurance. Indeed, President Bush also wants to follow the lead
of numerous states and place a statutory cap on how much the pa-
tient's lawyer can charge his or her client for winning the lawsuit.50
Starting with pain and suffering, this certainly is the most inherently
subjective feature of damages awards, unlike the more objective cal-
culation of how much money the injured patients need to replace their
lost earnings. What actually comes before the juries ranges from the
physiological pain suffered from the injury, treatment, and recupera-
tion to an enduring loss of enjoyment of life when a permanent disa-
bility blocks the victim from enjoying the pleasures of normal
personal and social activities. Even if the patient died quickly, the
family-member plaintiffs have experienced the anguish of seeing their
spouse or child in pain and of watching them pass away, and then
experienced the further emotional distress of forever losing them.
The legal policy problem is that a once and for all lay jury is basically
asked to judge what the approximate financial translation of this
purely psychological loss is.
Another important body of empirical research has discovered first
that, while juries are only half as likely to find in favor of plaintiff-
patients in medical malpractice cases as they are in automobile acci-
dent cases, the average awards (or settlements) for the medical mal-
practice cases are three times as high for the same kind of injury and
disability.51 Even within these malpractice cases themselves, the aver-
age awards in the top quartile are approximately ten times higher than
those in the bottom quartile for what scientists have appraised as es-
sentially the same severity of injury. 52
A further consequence of this disparity and unpredictability sur-
rounding the ultimate jury verdict is that even the clear medical negli-
gence cases are far harder to settle.53 This both deprives the victims of
the immediate relief needed for their basic financial losses, and im-
poses on the general public (i.e., future patients) the far greater finan-
cial costs of administering malpractice litigation which we pay for
through both health insurance premiums and taxes.
The ideal (and ethical) solution to this definite legal problem is not
to have our lawmakers simply impose a cap on how much the jury can
award for patient pain and suffering. If we want to be truly fair, we
50. HEALTH Act of 2003, S. 607, 108th Cong. § 6(a)(2)(B) (2003).
51. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffer-
ing", 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 908 (1989).
52. Id. at 938.
53. Id. at 917.
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must, instead, develop and provide to the juries a set of damages
guidelines, based not just on the severity of the injury, but also on the
age of the victim. In other words, our legislators, not just our juries,
should finally recognize that there is a qualitative-and thence a
quantitative-difference in the pain felt by an eighty-year-old patient
with a limp and a twenty-year-old patient rendered blind, both in-
curred as a result of mistakes made by their respective health care
givers.
Congress' ideal role, then, should be to pass a law requiring all
states to establish such a guidelines system to replace both their at-
large jury verdicts and their inequitable, non-inflated damages cap re-
gime. Each state should create its own body-consisting not just of
doctors, lawyers, and insurers, but also of past and future patients-to
appraise an array of injuries (i.e., being crippled, scarred, or losing a
toe), the duration of the pain (i.e., to a baby or to her grandfather),
and the like. Once the combination of these various factors have been
graded together (ranging from one to one hundred, not just A to F),
then financial numbers should be attached to each. Those figures
must be based on the total amount that people in the state want to
spend on compensating all of their annual patient-victims' pain and
suffering, divided by both the seriousness of the various injuries and
the percentage of occurrences that each type represents of all injuries.
After that legislative and administrative initiative has been com-
pleted, these guidelines (i.e., damages scales) can then be given to the
jury to enable it to rationally appraise the appropriate financial com-
pensation for what regularly are rather idiosyncratic cases. As we
gain more experience with more cases across the country, these guide-
lines bodies can be recalled to expand or even to revise its figures.
Such a regime is obviously much fairer to all patients (in the three
patient-roles mentioned earlier) than our two current legal schemes-
either unguided jury discretion or a one-sided legislative cap with no
damages floor. It is also much more efficient in two respects. First,
both trial judges and appeals courts will have sounder footing on
which to make their judgments about whether the jury numbers were
unreasonably high (or low). Second, both sides to the case will have a
bigger incentive and assurance in having their lawyers reach a pre-trial
settlement rather than putting themselves through the trauma and ex-
pense of a protracted trial (where malpractice suits dwarf automobile
accidents in both the percentage of claims that go to court and the
length of time to receive a jury verdict). 54
54. See id. at 926.
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While pain and suffering is obviously the most visible law reform
issue here, and the one most in need of a fairer stance, another feature
of malpractice damages regularly constrained by state legislatures and
debated in Congress relates to the victim's financial losses. More spe-
cifically, even more states than those that have restrained pain and
suffering awards have enacted some version of "collateral source
offsets." 5
5
This phrase means that the part of the patient-victim's financial
losses which are covered by other forms of compensation-such as
health care insurance or the employer making up for the lost pay-is
to be deducted from the tort award.56 In my previous writings and
testimony I have always supported this brand of general tort reform,
but only if another key financial item is added to the award.
5 7
The standard rationale offered by its political proponents is that this
offset will eliminate what is labeled a "windfall" double payment to
the victim from two different insurers.5 8 The opponent's response is
that if we feel committed to a "free" market economy, the principled
way to eliminate such double payments is to have the first party insur-
ers simply include in their contracts with potential victims this addi-
tional term. Any health care expenses or lost wages recovered by the
victim from a "guilty" third party and its liability insurer are to be
returned to the first party insurer. More important, though, from the
point of view of those of us who ultimately bear the cost burdens of all
of these brands of insurance, is the necessity of making our first party
insurers bear these costs. First party insurers spend less than 10% of
their revenues on administrative and litigation expenses, whereas
medical liability insurers spend 55% to 60% of their revenues that
way, which we eventually pay for as part of our health care expenses.
These are the key reasons why my ALI partners and I have long
advocated both a collateral source offset for financial damages and
guidelines for pain and suffering damages-not just for medical mal-
practice cases, but also for all personal injury tort litigation. 59 Neither
of these changes would be justifiable, or even ethical, unless accompa-
nied by a key reform regarding the way the law treats the victorious
plaintiffs' major use of these two damages items-paying their law-
yers' fees.
55. See WEILER, supra note 21, at 32.
56. Id. at 51 (stating that "the prospect of a tort windfall for losses already compensated
would aggravate rather than reduce the overall risk of medical injuries").
57. See id. at 31-32.
58. See Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care Reform, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 1157, 1177 (1995).
59. See WEILER, supra note 21, at 61-69.
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The standard practice developed by our free market in legal ser-
vices for tort suits is that while the defendant's attorney is paid on an
hourly basis (with the fee rate dependent on the lawyer's relative tal-
ent and reputation), the plaintiff's attorney is paid only if he or she
wins the case.60 That "contingent" fee is always made a percentage of
the award amount, typically one-third of it (but sometimes rising as
the award figure gets higher). That kind of lawyer reward has always
seemed justifiable in our tort law market not just because it pays for
the attorney's work in cases that do not succeed in the courtroom, but
also because it gives the lawyers a strong personal incentive to care-
fully assess the merits of each case before deciding to take it on, or
even to continue pursuing it after assessing the host of pre-trial
witnesses.
As always, though, reacting to the relative unpopularity of tort law-
yers, the standard legislative response has been just to impose a ceil-
ing on permissible plaintiff fees. The typical statutory measure (again
begun in California back in 1975) is to cap the percentage at 40% for
the first relatively small award or settlement amount, and then to re-
duce the lawyer's share down to as low as 10% as the damages figure
rises.61 Actually, it was Florida that made the more rational judgment
of basing that sliding fee ceiling on when the case was resolved-such
as by pre-trial settlement, by jury verdict, or on appeal. 62 That system
is better for the public, not just private, interests because it encourages
more voluntary resolutions of these cases by both sides. The defen-
dant doctor can pay less while the injured patient ends up with a
higher amount by settling the case earlier, without the lawyers having
to do more work and thus getting paid more.
However, the rather immoral as well as irrational feature of either
of these brands of legislative policy is that they only seek to restrain
the fees, and thus influence the judgments of the injured patient's law-
yer, and not the judgments of the lawyers representing the doctors,
hospitals, and their liability insurers. Contrary to the standard myth
that plaintiffs' lawyers are much better paid than their defense-side
counterparts (fueled by the huge publicity given to such record-setting
cases as the $250 billion tobacco suit settlement),63 the average plain-
tiffs' lawyers earnings are roughly the same as those on the defense
side (as must be the case in this free market setting).
60. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 524 (9th ed. 1994).
61. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003).
62. FLA. BAR REG. R. 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) (2003).
63. Big Tobacco Strikes Deal with States, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at A20.
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Thus, if we feel we really need to regulate this one branch of the
legal market, the only rational as well as ethical brand of regulation is
to impose such restraints on both sides of these cases. After all, we
have to preserve a reasonably level legal field by ensuring that all of
the highly skilled tort lawyers do not feel financially motivated to
move over to the defense side where there are no caps on how much
higher they can be paid than their opponents. And remember, it is
not the doctors, hospitals, and their insurers, but the past, present, and
future patients (some of whom are even plaintiffs) who are actually
financing those fees as part of their overall health insurance costs.
More importantly, though, if we want to embark on a productive
and principled reform of medical malpractice damages, we should
combine that collateral source offset and pain and suffering guidelines
reform by adding another feature to those damages awards-the win-
ning plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees. That "reasonability" judg-
ment again should rest on some sensible guidelines proposed by
neutral litigation experts, and based on the nature and complexity of
the case and the time at which the complaint was resolved (and thus
the amount of work the lawyer had to do). Just as we already do in
litigation, those legal fees are realistically judged to be just as much a
part of the victim's damages as the additional doctor fees.64 We
should not, then, feel compelled to have a losing plaintiff pay the de-
fendant's fees because: first, the plaintiff was not being negligent in
filing the suit (unlike the losing defendant); and second, the doctors
and hospitals are already fully insulated (via malpractice insurance)
against these legal costs-something that the past and future patients
have already paid for as part of their health insurance or medical fees.
VI. WHO SHOULD BE LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE?
This packaging together of all the legitimate changes in damages
awards in our medical malpractice system-ideally in all tort suits-is
a morally moderate reform because it is designed to serve general
public needs rather than just specific private interests. We must recog-
nize, though, that there is an important and legitimate group whose
needs would not be fully served by any brand of damages reform: the
individual physicians who are being sued.
One aspect of this is the major difference between insurance premi-
ums experienced by obstetricians and surgeons and those experienced
64. WEILER, supra note 21, at 66.
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by doctors in specialties. 65 Neither the typically unfair damages caps
nor the very fair damages guidelines can do much for the former
group who are far more likely than the latter to be producing both
patient injuries and lawsuits from their brands of treatment. This is
why, for example, numerous obstetricians now feel compelled to stop
delivering babies and just concentrate on things like birth control and
other gynecology roles.66 However, even though it would reduce their
premium costs to around one quarter of their annual costs, their coun-
terpart gynecologists, psychiatrists, general practitioners, and all other
physicians still experience or face the risk of the personal burden and
emotional distress of being personally sued. Not only must they
devote a considerable part of their time and effort to defending the
suit, but also they must bear the cost to their reputation and personal
lives of being publicly found negligent (which my HMPS partners
often found to be due to incorrect judgments by our lay juries).67
Since my HMPS partners often found these negligence (or not) ver-
dicts to be based on incorrect judgments made by our lay juries, we
need to repair that branch of the law even more than the damages
awards. As scholar Philip Howard elegantly displayed in his recent
book, The Collapse of the Common Good, the best way to effect this
repair is not by once and for all giving jury members better guidance
about whether or not the doctor was negligent, but by replacing the
jury system with what I would label a Medical Liability Tribunal.68 A
pioneering pilot program to demonstrate the effects of such a system
has been developed for obstetrics cases in Massachusetts by my
HMPS and ALI partner, Dr. Troy Brennan, and whether to authorize
such a legal experiment is now being debated in our state legislature.69
I have long supported this effort because such a full-time adminis-
trative body (analogous to every state's workers' compensation
boards for workplace injuries) would be comprised of people with real
medical, as well as legal, expertise in deciding whether negligent treat-
ment actually caused the current disability of the patient-plaintiff.
65. See BHAT, supra note 21, at 33; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 13; Tanya
Albert, Liability Premium Increases Slowing, Yet Rates Remain at Record Highs, AM. MED.
NEWS, Nov. 15, 2004, at 1.
66. See, e.g., Tanya Albert, No State Immune to Liability Stress, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 23,
2004, at 1 (describing physicians in several states who have given up high-risk parts of their
practices due to liability insurance premiums).
67. See WEILER, supra note 21, at 1 (discussing the "personal, emotional cast to a lawsuit
between patient and doctor that gives medical claims an edge that is not present" in other suits).
68. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: How AMERICA'S LAWSUIT
CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM 58-62 (2001).
69. For the statute governing our state's existing malpractice tribunal, see MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 231, § 60B (2000).
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Another important benefit of such expert accuracy replacing regular
law errors is the reduction of the extensive delays experienced in
reaching a malpractice verdict. Not only is the administrative process
much faster than the tort system, but also both sides would have a
much greater incentive to settle the case without a trial, rather than
gamble on a future jury making a mistake in their favor.
The next big step, a substantive change, is one that my ALI col-
leagues and I fashioned for responding to legitimate doctor concerns
about our current legal (not just jury) regime. We should replace the
traditional personal liability of individual physicians by a new full-
blown enterprise liability of health care organizations. As we will see,
this change will actually serve the interests of patients as well as doc-
tors. Thus, we were pleased to learn that in her earlier role, Hillary
Clinton was persuaded to make this proposal the key malpractice rec-
ommendation to her husband's administration as part of their broader
health care reform.70 We were all saddened, though, to hear the doc-
tors' representatives (both the AMA and the Physician Insurers Asso-
ciation of America (PIAA)) saying to Congress, "please don't take
our liability away from us." Instead, they advocated various caps on
the amount that the injured patients and their lawyers can secure in
the courtroom.
Of course, this truly moderate reform would apparently make a rad-
ical change in our historic "corrective justice" theory of tort law,7 1
making the culpable actor pay for all the damages he has inflicted on
the innocent victim. However, especially in medical malpractice, that
tort principle has long been transformed by our free market creation
of liability insurance. Almost always it is not the negligent physician
but his insurer who pays all of the costs of these suits, with present and
future patients ultimately paying for that malpractice insurance
through the fees charged for their medical services. In sum, tort law is
no longer "correcting" an "injustice" done by a "guilty" doctor to an
"innocent" patient-which the law has not been doing anyway be-
cause of the regular mistakes made by our legal system in judging
whether a negligent injury actually took place in our medical system.
From an economic perspective especially, it is the insured public in
general who collectively bears the cost of these injuries and this part
of our legal system.
The law itself has already made some significant moves away from
pure individual physician liability. Under general tort theory, the hos-
70. See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. § 5311 (proposing creation of the Enter-
prise Liability Demonstration Project).
71. See WEILER, supra note 21, at 44-46.
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pital has always been vicariously liable for the negligence of the physi-
cians it is employing, just like it has been for the nurses and other staff
members who are involved in a substantial number of these cases.
The hospital has occasionally been found liable under the "agency"
concept, based on the apparent authority it is exercising over non-
employed doctors dealing with patients in the hospital's emergency,
radiology, and anesthetic rooms.72 Yet another legal doctrine used
here is "corporate" liability, for failing to check the original creden-
tials and ongoing performance of the independent doctors whom it
permits to come in and deliver babies and perform operations inside
its facility. 73 Hence, even if it is the patients who have personally
picked their doctors, the hospitals can be sued for negligently failing
to maintain qualifications and performance of their doctors.
Having analyzed these judicial starting points, my ALI partners and
I fashioned our proposal arguing that legislators go all the way and
make hospitals and other health care organizations bear liability for
all physician negligence, as they have long had to do for all nursing
mistakes. Not only would this largely relieve obstetricians and sur-
geons of the emotional as well as financial burdens of litigation and
liability insurance, but also it would leave patients much better off as
the supposed beneficiary of the three functions that modern tort law is
supposed to be performing for them.
First, enterprise liability is much better than individual doctor liabil-
ity in ensuring that patients who have already been negligently injured
are going to be fully compensated, because the regular surges in insur-
ance premiums for high-risk specialties have led many obstetricians
and surgeons to reduce ceilings on their own malpractice insurance. 74
That step has actually imposed de facto caps on how much the most
seriously injured patients can recover for their financial losses as well
as for their pain and suffering because faced with a multi-million dol-
lar and largely uninsured jury verdict, some doctor-defendants now
use another branch of our law-bankruptcy-to relieve themselves of
that liability.
Second, enterprise liability reduces the administrative and legal
costs of overall malpractice insurance, which is about double the per-
centage of our automobile liability insurance.75 We would no longer
have multiple defendants (who now make up around one quarter of
72. WEILER, supra note 21, at 125 (stating that, by the 1960s, courts had "largely cleared away
[the] initial legal obstacles to a hospital's liability for the negligence of its own employees").
73. See id. (discussing the concept of "ostensible authority").
74. See id. at 125-26.
75. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 51, at 929.
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all malpractice suits),76 each of which has to have both separate legal
counsel and liability insurers.77 This also makes it more likely that the
parties will (as my Harvard colleague Roger Fisher once put it) "get to
yes"'78 in negotiating a peaceful settlement to the suit because only
one defendant has to agree with the plaintiff-patient on the appropri-
ate terms. There is also no longer a group of defendants having to
determine how to divide these damages among themselves.
Third, tort law's most important role, injury prevention, is also the
one most likely to be enhanced by the move from individual physician
to organizational liability.79 In contrast with the doctors who typically
are fully insured against damages payments, hospitals and other
health care bodies have always had either experience-rated or pure
self insurance against malpractice suits and awards.80 Thus, they have
the real financial incentive to take the steps necessary to provide bet-
ter and more effective patient care.
True, even fully insured doctors have a strong incentive to reduce
the emotional and reputational burden of lawsuits that assert they
were negligent in treating their patients. However, they would face
somewhat the same burden and incentive (like the nurse-employees)
even if we moved from individual to enterprise liability. But as we
have already learned from the product liability setting, the best tort
way to reduce injuries is to add to our traditional concentration on
momentary and inadvertent errors by an individual a new organiza-
tional incentive to find a common pattern in all the individual mis-
takes, one that can then effectively be dealt with through a safer mode
of treatment. 81
One of those common patterns may well be doctors who are most
prone to make these mistakes in treating their patients. The responsi-
ble organization thus has this legal incentive to create an internal peer
review committee as one of its quality assurance programs. This com-
mittee should consist of a few top physicians who regularly review the
performance and patient results of their colleagues, whether or not
these have produced lawsuits upheld by juries. They then make ex-
pert judgments as to whether any detectable individual problems are
the result of their skills or their work settings, and what must be done
to remove either source. The fact that we have always made the air-
76. WEILER, supra note 21, at 127.
77. Id.
78. See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITH-
OUT GIVING IN (1991).
79. WEILER, supra note 21, at 129.
80. Id. at 130.
81. See id. at 130-31.
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lines, not the pilots, bear the legal responsibility for any plane
crashes8 2 should be the role model to reduce what our HMPS found to
be a far greater aggregate risk in the hospital than up in the air.
In contrast with what I stated earlier about malpractice damages, I
am not advocating tfiat Congress enact a law mandating a national
move from individual to organizational medical liability. Instead, as
my ALl partner Ken Abraham and I proposed a decade ago, the more
sensible step is for various states to conduct their own experiments
about the appropriate design of this more radical (but equally ethical)
reform of our existing judge-made law. 83 We were pleased by the
more ethical brand of federal reform introduced by Wyoming Senator
Mike Enzi in July 2003. His proposed Reliable Medical Justice Act
aimed to provide federal funding for such state experiments, as long
as the states also conducted detailed analyses and made reports about
how they were working. 84
One key issue is which is the appropriate enterprise to bear such
responsibility-for example, the hospital or the HMO? In more and
more situations, we do not need to make that choice because the two
bodies are legally related. Where they are totally separate, though,
the hospital is likely the better candidate to be the presumptively lia-
ble organization because it has a better intellectual and administrative
capacity than an insurer to make our health care safer, not just
cheaper.
Any such organizational liability must then be imposed not only for
negligent treatment that takes place inside the hospital, or outside to
patients who have been treated before or after that mistake, but also
ideally with respect to patients who never came into the hospital be-
cause their conditions were misdiagnosed in the doctors' offices. If, as
regularly happens, the careless doctor is affiliated with more than one
hospital, then the one where he or she does most of his or her work
(which should be designated for all doctors in the state) would bear
the legal responsibility for that latter case. But within that broader
statutory framework, the various hospitals and HMOs should still be
free to negotiate and agree to any contractual reallocations about the
financial costs, the design, and the administration of safety proce-
dures. The costs of this enterprise liability regime, like the current
one, would be paid for by the patients and their health care insurers.
82. See, e.g., Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967).
83. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution
of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 421-36 (1994).
84. Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1518, 108th Cong. (2003).
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VII. FAULT vs. No-FAULT LIABILITY
While the legal move from individual to enterprise medical liability
should be made on the state level, federal law must make it clear that
state legislatures are free to make this move if they so choose. State
governments should also give the same freedom to their health care
bodies to begin experimenting with what I have long advocated as an
even more radical reform-moving from fault-based to no-fault medi-
cal liability. This is an ethical step because it will treat the patient who
is injured in the hospital in essentially the same legal fashion as a
nurse injured there.
To understand why it is also a very productive move, we should
compare no-fault liability with current medical malpractice in terms of
the three basic tort policy standards. The most obvious gain from no-
fault liability is that it will provide compensation to everyone who was
injured by their medical treatment, not just to those patients who were
able to detect and prove to a jury that some identifiable negligence
caused their injury. This approach is also financially feasible because
reimbursing the costs of those injuries would add just a tiny fraction to
our constantly surging $1.4 trillion health care budget 85 (some part of
which is already spent to give the additional care needed by medically
injured patients). More importantly, if we do follow the workers'
compensation model, we would actually be stabilizing the costs of re-
imbursing injured patients and reducing the number of injured
patients.
This legally required medical injury compensation should be pro-
vided only for relatively serious injuries-such as those that last for at
least two months. While the more slightly injured patients would thus
be formally deprived of their current legal rights if their injuries were
due to negligence, the fact is that they typically are insured against
those short-term health care costs and lost pay, and would rarely be
suing for such pain and suffering. Even for the lengthier medical inju-
ries, this no-fault compensation regime should be reimbursing patients
for just their net, not their gross, losses, leaving first party insurance to
play the same primary reimbursement role that I have also endorsed
under the collateral source offset principle, even for fault-based
liability.
Next, following the same principle of workers' compensation for in-
jured nurses, the net wage losses to be reimbursed by no-fault patient
compensation should be based on a scale ranging from 100% of the
85. For one account of the rising cost of our health care system, see Katharine Levit et al.,
Health Spending Rebound Continues in 2002, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 147, 148.
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pay lost by low-paid workers, to 80% of the average worker earnings,
and down to 50% or less of the lost earnings of those at or above three
times that average (though ideally these ceilings should also be ad-
justed by the number of family members being supported by the now-
disabled patient). This is actually a much more equitable form of legal
redress because it is the working class majority of this country who
will bear the bulk of the costs of this regime (as they now do for mal-
practice litigation) as a portion of their public and private health care
premiums. The more well-to-do families, who have always been far
more likely to be fully insured for all their health care treatments, can
also make sure they have invested in private disability insurance to
cover their additional lost pay (as we already do above our basic So-
cial Security plan). Following these principles, our HMPS research
found that the costs of this far broader and fairer brand of medical
injury insurance are fully affordable when compared to the present
expenditures on malpractice litigation and insurance.
This far broader, no-fault medical compensation costs no more than
our much more limited fault-based liability system because the admin-
istrative expenditures for the former regime will be substantially lower
than for the latter. In contrast with the 60% of medical malpractice
administrative costs that is largely spent on determining whether an
injured patient is entitled to any redress under tort law, just a 20%
share is spent administering workers' compensation, providing for
faster, fairer, and broader benefits for injured nurses and other care
workers.
It is true, however, that the costs of administering a no-fault medical
liability regime would be somewhat higher than for workers' compen-
sation. The key reason is that some of the former cases would require
a judgment about whether the doctor had failed to make the correct
diagnosis or treatment that would have cured the original patient's
illness, but instead allowed it to develop into a permanent disability or
death. However, our Harvard Studies found these "close calls" to be
just a small share (around 5%) of the total number of medically pro-
duced injuries. This is just a fraction of the far more difficult judg-
ments that are now made about medical negligence-which include
not just discovering whether someone was at fault, but also whether it
was this particular mistake that actually gave rise to the current
disability.
Yet another benefit from this no-fault system is that eventually doc-
tors would feel little personal need to contest such claims. Indeed,
just like supervisors now do for their injured workers, they would be
far more likely to help rather than hinder their injured patients' at-
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tempts to secure this crucial and fair compensation for their additional
health care costs and lost earnings. Patient groups should also em-
brace rather than resist this idea of moving from our current slow and
expensive process of trying to get in front of a one-time lay jury to
decide whether the doctor was at fault, to the streamlined process of a
full-time expert tribunal (made up of both expert doctors and lawyers)
judging whether previous health care was one of the causes of the
patient's current disability (or death).
As we have already witnessed with my earlier reform proposals, this
now brings us to an even more important legal policy dimension than
providing more equitable compensation through more economical ad-
ministration for past injuries-securing more effective prevention of
future injuries. This last feature is the key reason why we should not
be tempted to adopt for medical injuries the even more equitable and
inexpensive Medicare and Social Security models, which require proof
only of the current disability and its financial losses without regard to
causation.86
Our lengthy experience with having limited no-fault workers' com-
pensation for those employees injured on the job (rather than at
home, for example) provides legally and financially responsible em-
ployers with a major incentive to invest in and undertake serious ef-
forts to make their workplaces safer, and thus not only prevent future
injuries to their staff, but also reduce this brand of their productive
costs. 87 The most revealing research appraisal of this feature of work-
ers' compensation was done by my Harvard colleague and ALI part-
ner Kip Viscusi. He discovered that, by comparison with government
regulation of employer actions under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA), 88 which reduced workplace deaths by around
2% to 3%, the experience-rated workers' compensation laws are an-
nually preventing 25% to 30% of what otherwise would be fatal acci-
dents or diseases inflicted on employees by their jobs.8 9
An even bigger gain might well be achieved under no-fault medical
injury law. Even though our HMPS research in New York, Colorado,
and Utah found that the majority of medical injuries are covered by
what were then judged to be blameless forms of medical treatment,
the fact that even these patients' damages would have to be paid for
86. See, e.g., Carpentier v. Sullivan, 755 F. Supp. 816, 820 (C.D. I11. 1990) (summarizing the
two-step process by which a plaintiff may establish disability under the Social Security Act).
87. See, e.g., 80 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/11 (2001) (providing compensation only for "injuries
sustained by [an] employee arising out of and in the course of the employment").
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
89. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation,
1973-1983, 17 RAND J. ECON. 567 (1986).
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by an experience-rated or even self-insured hospital or other health
care body would give them all a major legal and financial incentive to
make this form of medical treatment safer as well as more productive.
Numerous hospitals, HMOs, and physician firms could poll their
files about all patient injuries they needed to compensate and how
exactly they were covered. Using this raw material (and aspiring for a
future Nobel Prize), medical school and other scientific scholars
would be able to devote some serious research efforts to devising the
procedures and inventing the technologies that would help prevent
future health care injuries, not just cure the original patient diseases.
Both my ALI and HMPS scholarly partners have long been com-
mitted to the value of this truly radical tort reform. However, I should
make clear that we have not been advocating, at least at this stage,
that our legislators (even at the state, let alone federal level) should be
mandating the immediate replacement of out long-term, fault-based
malpractice law by this brand of no-fault medical injury compensa-
tion. Instead, we need some serious experiments of this type to be
engaged in by such bodies as the Harvard Health Care System. All
we need from the legislatures are statutes that explicitly permit this to
be done (and ideally offer some financial aid, as Senator Enzi has
been calling for), as long as these plans meet the kind of truly fair
standards synopsized here and elaborated in my book Medical Mal-
practice on Trial.
Indeed, as I discovered while working on the new edition of my
Sports and the Law text,90 there has been a surge in lawsuits against
the team physicians in professional sports, especially in the more dan-
gerous sports, football and hockey. 91 These suits are filed by players
who were injured on the field or the ice, who then found their injuries
and professional careers aggravated rather than alleviated by the doc-
tor care provided by their teams.92 These sports malpractice cases
tend to produce far larger awards and settlements because of the way
the average player salary has surged under major league unionization.
On the other side, though, a considerable number of both doctors and
insurers have recently decided to opt out of this specific branch of
their professional lives.
Thus, what I have proposed as an insightful (and also popular) ex-
periment here would be for the National Football League (NFL) and/
or the National Hockey League (NHL) and their players' unions, the
90. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS
(3d ed. 2004).
91. Id. at 1130.
92. Id. at 1130-31.
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National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) and the Na-
tional Hockey League Players' Association (NHLPA), to design and
put into operation the specifics of this no-fault regime. The doctors
should be made part-time employees-ideally, of the league, not indi-
vidual teams, in order to avoid the tension between the wishes of the
injured player's family and those of his coach that produced many of
these cases. Then, both the actual losses of the injured players would
be fully compensated and the leagues would have the incentive to
make their games somewhat safer. The players as a whole, as well as
the team doctors, would find this to be a much more productive as
well as amicable instrument for shaping game care than sending a few
(usually retired) players off to court.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I trust we have all now seen what I meant by advocating "radically
moderate" as well as ethical law reform. This approach has us looking
for a host of legal changes, ranging from the most obvious issues on
the surface, to those that address the fundamental problems generated
by the interplay of medical, legal, and even financial regimes. But to
be truly ethical, we must only endorse reforms that, rather than de-
signed to serve the special interests of any one (or even all) of these
groups, focus instead on the truly public good-protecting the needs
of past, present, and future patients in all three of these important
citizen roles.
That is why my HMPS and ALI colleagues fashioned the three
brands of malpractice law reform I have presented here. The first,
damages guidelines, seeks to ensure that already injured patients se-
cure all, but no more than they actually deserve to redress their losses.
The second, moving from personal to enterprise liability, not only
gives our doctors some insulation from the special emotional and fi-
nancial burden that this litigation regularly generates for them (far
more than any other profession's experience, including lawyers,
judges, and law professors), but also gives patients much better pro-
tection, both in realizing their legal claims and enhancing their initial
medical treatment.
Our most radical malpractice reform-moving from fault to no-
fault liability and thus treating injured patients in the same fashion as
injured nurses-is potentially the most productive on all of these pa-
tient dimensions. We should hope, then, that we will have both a leg-
islative reform that makes such an experiment legally permissible, and
a truly ethical enterprise like the NFL or NHL that can then give us
all the benefits of their experience in that new legal venture.
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